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JUDICIAL REVIEW vs. JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
BY THE HONORABLE JOSEPH L. CALL *
... any secure possession of their (the people's) civil rights is absolute-
ly dependent upon unvarying adhesion to the letter and the spirit of the Con-
stitution. For that great instrument, defining and restraining the powers of
those persons in the representative, executive, and judicial departments of the
Government, to whom the people from time to time commit the administra-
tion of the laws, is the sole charter of their political liberties, and their only
barrier against usurpation. It is itself the government, of which men, duly
chosen for the purpose, are only administrators. If disregarded in any one of its
essential provisions-no matter under what plea, or what pretext-though the
forms of a republic may for a time, and possibly, from habit or whatever
cause, for a considerable time, may remain; yet the life of the republic will
have, in fact, departed .... " -GEORGE LUNT
0 THERWISE expressed it may be stated that power is insatiable; and
permeates and penetrates all government; and that the power of gov-
ernment is always dangerous in any hands.
Under our Declaration of Independence and Federal Constitution the
principles of absolute sovereignty in the government, and subordination of
the people to the State, were completely and unconditionally repudiated and
in the place of this sinister inexpiable doctrine, the natural principles of self-
government were adopted; and the principle that "sovereignty vested in the
people-that magistrates were consequently their trustees" became the beacon
light of the new republic. As a result of the adoption of this basic principle
the Federal government became operative upon purely conventional rights or
powers, with all such powers being initially delegated by the people.
In the division of powers the people created three basic divisions of gov-
ernment: the Legislative,' the Executive,2 the Judiciary.' There being no
statement in the Constitution that any one branch is superior to any other
* LLB., University of Southern California College of Law, 1925. Member of the Cali-
fornia Bar, the Los Angeles Bar Association, the Conference of California Judges of the State of
California, and the Lawyers Club of Los Angeles; honorary member of the Phi Delta Phi legal
fraternity. Judge of the Municipal Court, City of Los Angeles, 1931-1956; Presiding Judge, 1945.
Judge of the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of Los Angeles,
1956-. Author, Government by Decree through Executive Agreement, 6 BAYLOR L. REV. 277
(1954); Limited Government and the Welfare Clause, 60 DICK. L. REV. 197 (1956); co-author,
Should the Constitution be Amended to Limit the Treaty Making Power, 26 So. CALIF. L. REV.
347 (1953).
1 U. S, CoNST., art. 1.
2 Ibid., art. II.
3 Ibid., art. III.
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branch, it can only be concluded that all three branches are co-ordinate divi-
sions each supreme within the limits of its own sphere.
While no superiority is delegated to any one division over any other, it
is James Madison who tells us that the Federal Convention was clearly of the
opinion that it was essential to our contemplated form of government that
there be a provision in the Constitution for deciding in a peaceful and regular
mode, all cases arising under its operation, and that it intended the judicial
department as a final resort in this respect.' Accordingly, three basic principles
were written into the Federal Constitution which provided that:
"This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made
in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; ..." 5
"The judical power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme
Court, and in such inferior courts as the congress may from time to time ordain
and establish...." 6
"The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising
under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their authority .... ., 7
It is under the postulates of these provisions that the Supreme Court as-
sumed the last word in determining the constitutionality, or unconstitutionality,
of both acts of Congress and state legislatures, and it is this power that is
commonly known as the power of judicial review. Originally the principle
of judicial review was recognized by the Supreme Court in 1796 in Hilton v.
United States,8 wherein the court discussed and approved the doctrine. How-
ever, it was not until 1803 in the famous case of Marbury v. Madison that the
principle was definitely settled and the doctrine of Judicial Review of Con-
gressional Acts conclusively established? Literalized and rephrased with ele-
gant atticism by Professor Corwin the principles of this decision have been
succinctly and concisely stated as follows:
"Since the Constitution is law (Art. VI, Sec. 2) it must be interpreted and
enforced by the judges in cases arising under it. (Art. III, Sec. 2. Part 1).
4 WUTINGS (Hunt Edition) Vol. 9, at 142.
5 U. S. CONST., art. VI, § 2.
6 Ibid., art. III, § 1.
7 Ibid., art. III, § 2.
83 Dallas 171.
9The principle of judicial review had, however, prior to Hilton v. United States and Mar-
bury v. Madison, been recognized by Federal Circuit Courts. In 1792, in Rhode Island, state legis-
lation was invalidated in Champion v. Casey; in 1793, in the State of Connecticut, in Connecticut
v. Courant; and in 1795, in Pennsylvania, in VanHorn's Lessee v. Dorrance. In 1816, in Martin
v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, the Supreme Court adopted the principle of review of the final
decisions of state courts involving federal questions. In Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264 (1821),
Justice Story reaffirmed the doctrine in a very considered opinion.
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Since it is 'supreme law' (Art. VI, Sec. 2) the judges must give it preference
over any other law." 10
It is, of course, clear that the doctrine invoked by the court in deducing
this principle is not one of substitution of law but of interpretation of law,
and is not based upon any right, or power of its own in the matter. Expressed
in absolute singleness it is the judicial declaration of a void act void, and of
course to be a lawful declaration it must involve a rightful and accurate ex-
position of the constitution.
This doctrine has been the subject of very rigorous and severe denounce-
ment and impeachment.
John Taylor, credited with having one of the keenest and -most analytical
legal minds in the United States, severely criticized the doctrine of Judicial
Review. Summarizing his contentions very briefly and with considerable di-
versity, he states his conclusions in part as follows:
". .. There is no phrase in the constitution which even insinuates, that
the actual divisions of power should be altered or impaired by incidental or im-
plied powers. . . . Let it be remembered . . . that the means for executing
the powers delegated to the latter [Federal government] are frequently marked,
whilst those for executing the power reserved to the former, [State govern-
ment] are left chiefly unlimited. And then let it be computed, which sphere
may make the greatest use of the strange position 'that means, or incidental,
or implied powers not excluded, are not prohibited,' however they may be
at discord with the positive diversions of power....." (Writer's paren-
theses.)
"... That court [Supreme Court] by declaring every local or internal law
,of Congress constitutional, would extend its own jurisdiction; a limitation of
which, attended with a power to extend it without control, by a supreme power
over the state courts, would be no limitation at all; since the power of su-
premacy would destroy the co-ordinate right of construing the constitution, in
which resides the power of enforcing the limitation. The jurisdiction, limited
by its own will, is an unlimited jurisdiction.... .12 (Writer's parentheses.)
"If the division of powers among the great number of political depart-
ments, endowed with rights independent of each other, constitutes its chief
beauty, its distinctive superiority, and its soundest security for human happiness;
then the absence of supremacy or sovereignty in one department over the rest
does not require the expedient of shuffling words and phrases for the purpose
of getting rid of an imaginary defect, by introducing the very evil intended
to be avoided...., 18
10 CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 67.
11 JOHN TAYLOR, CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUED, AND CONSTITUTIONS VINDICATED 109 (1820).
12 Ibid., p. 31.
13 Ibid., p. 140.
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There is also an amplitude of additional analytical reflections and com-
mentaries upon this question.1'
In any event, the Marshall doctrine of Judicial Review has been the law
of the land. Undoubtedly if the court had absolutely adhered to the true
doctrine of Judicial Review which essentially created a veto upon legislative
and executive acts, clearly unconstitutional, such canons would receive the
constant enthusiastic endorsement and advocacy of all proponents of limited
government and true constitutional liberty.
The doctrine of Judicial Review, principally in cases involving personal
liberty and freedom secured through the Bill of Rights, clearly shows that the
doctrine has yielded great deterrence against legislative encroachment, though
in the Legal Tender Cases 1 and the Insular Cases 18 hereinafter discussed, the
court refused to exercise the doctrine in the face of clear constitutional man-
date.
Prior to 1863 only two acts of Congress were declared void, and a brief
analysis of some leading cases since 1870 is clearly convincing that the Supreme
Court has been outstanding in guarding the individual against irresponsible
legislative ordinances.
In the case of justices v. Murray 17 in 1870, certain facts had been tried
and determined in favor of plaintiff in the state courts. Congress had at-
tempted by legislation to sanction a new hearing of the case in the United
States courts. The court held that so much of the fifth section of the Act of
Congress of March 3, 1863 as provides for the removal of a judgment in a
state court and in which the cause was tried by a jury, to the federal courts
for a retrial on the facts and law, is not in pursuance of the Federal Constitu-
tion and is void.
In 1886, in Boyd v. United States, " Congress attempted the unlawful
authorization of search and seizure of personal and private papers, and such
legislation was negated by the court. In Gould v. United States 19 the prin-
ciple is emphatically re-affirmed.
14 Gilbert E. Rowe, "Our judicial Oligarchy'; The Development and Evaluation of Judicial
Review, 13 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW AND STATE BAR JOURNAL (1938). EDWARD S. CORWIN,
COURT OVER CONSTITUTION 17 (1928); HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SU-
PREMACY (2d ed. 1932).
15 The Legal Tender Cases: Knox v. Lee and Parker v. Davis, 12 Wallace 457 (1871); Jul-
liard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884).
16 The Insular Cases: Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); and Hawaii v. Makichi,. 190
U.S. 197 (1903).
179 Wallace 274 (1869).
18 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
19255 U.S. 298 (1921).
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In the case of Wong Wing v. United States,20 plaintiff and others had
been found by the U. S. Commissioner to be illegally within the country, and
ordered by him incarcerated at hard labor for a period 0f 60 days and then
removed to China. The court declared unconstitutional the legislative act
which so authorized their commitment to jail without indictment by grand
jury and subsequent trial by jury.
In Councilman v. Hitchcock,21 a leading and oft-cited case on the question
of self incrimination. Congress passed legislation sanctioning criminal prose-
cution after obliging the individual to testify before a grand jury. The court
established the doctrine that absolute immunity from federal criminal prose-
cution, for offenses disclosed by the evidence, must be given a person compelled
to testify after claim of privilege against self-incrimination.22
In 1893, in Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States;, the court
points out that while Congress may determine what private property is needed
for public purposes, it cannot include what shall be the measure of compensa-
tion or what shall be just compensation; such question being judicial and not
legislative. And in this case due and full compensation was decreed as a
condition of the recommendation.2
In Kilborn v. Thompson,2' the House of Representatives had directed one
of its committees to make a particular investigation. In this case the com-
mittee was not directed to inquire into matters of which the House "had juris-
diction." The court held that the House of Representatives had exceeded its
power and announced the principle that neither House of Congress possessed
"general power of making inquiry into the private affairs of citizens."26
20 163 U.S. 288 (1896).
21 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
22 In Smith v. U.S., 337 U.S. 137 (1949), justice Reed, in commenting on Councilman v.
Hitchcock, points out that to meet the requirement of that case Congress amended the immunity
provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, Vol. 24 STATS. 383, § 12. These amendments protect a
witness in any subsequent criminal proceeding in the use against him of evidence so obtained,
the amendments provide that "the witness should not be . . . prosecuted
23 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
24 For an interesting discussion on the question of constitutional dispensing of jury trial in
fixing full compensation see Paxton Blair, Federal Condemnation Proceedings and the Seventh
Amendment, 41 HARV. L. REv. 29 (1927).
25 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
26 In Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 541 (1917), the House of Representatives had punished
for contempt, a person, not a member, for writing an ill-tempered letter to the foreman of one of
the, committees respecting the action and purposes of the committee. The question was whether
the House exceeded its power in punishing the writer for contempt of its. authority. The. writer
was not a member of its body. The court held that its action was without constitutional justification,
that the letter, while offensive, was not likely to affect the House in any of its proceedings or
functions. Also see Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 211 U.S. 407 (1908) ,and
Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1923).
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While these cases illustrate judicial enforcement of limited government
through judicial review, the cases also are multitudinous, with increasing em-
phasis, where constitutional limitations are overlooked and basic principles
compromised by interpretation, interpolation and interdirection. This in sub-
stance, is the doctrine of Judicial Supremacy and consists in reading into the
law either social, political or economic doctrines not contemplated by, or com-
prehended in the basic statute itself.
The Legal Tender Cases 2" and the Insular Cases," decided shortly after
the Civil War, show genesis and a commanding determination to sustain the
doctrine of Judicial Supremacy. To understand the Legal Tender Cases it is
necessary to first analyze briefly, Hepburn v. Griswold2 and the issues therein
decided.
Originally Congress was given the power in Article I, Section 8, Sub-
division 2 of the U. S. Constitution, "to borrow money on the credit of the
United States", and in the following Subsection 5, the power "to coin money,
regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standards of
weights and measures." These provisions were approved by the Federal Con-
vention (1787), after it had overwhelmingly voted (9 states to 2) to eliminate
from the proposed powers of Congress, the right to "emit bills of credit." "
At the time of this decision in the Convention, the members were well aware
of the evils of paper money, and the last thing intended to be conveyed was
the right to make paper money, legal tender. But, on the contrary, the debate
shows that it was intended and believed to be wholly beyond power of either
the union, or the states. The members of the Convention had just passed
through all the horrors of an unredeemed paper currency. They were well
aware of the fact that the history of unredeemed soft money had been, within
the view of those who staked their property on the public faith, "always freely
given and grossly violated", and that evils of such fiat issues had prostrated
all private and public credit and morals, and was responsible for such fraud
and chicanery as to destroy confidence, progress and development. Actually,
the country was still wallowing in the trough of unredeemed currency so hope-
lessly irredeemable as to actually be discarded as worthless. And they knew
further that it was in the face of such debauchery and profligacy in currency
issues that the country had returned, at the time of the Convention, to a specie
currency, and to hard money with an intrinsic value.
27 See note 15 supra.
28 See note 16 suprm.n
298 Wallace 603 (1870)..
30 FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, 11, 309.
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However, during the stress of the Civil War there was issued by the
Act of Congress of February 25, 1862, $150,000,000 of inconvertible paper
currency, and by law made legal tender for the payment of all debts, both
public and private. This was followed by the Acts of July 11, 1862 and
March 3, 1863, each of which authorized an additional issuance of $150,000,-
000 of paper currency. This legislation authorized a total issuance of $450,-
000,000 of fiat money, all of which was legal tender.
This paper money soon depreciated in value and it was not long before
its actual worth was only 35 cents on the dollar. Of course, such deprecia-
tion soon led to litigation, and it was such litigation that was involved in the
case of Hepburn v. Griswald in which the Supreme Court was called to pass
upon the constitutionality of these acts authorizing the payment of debts ex-
isting before the acts in legal tender notes. After elaborate argument and
presentation of authorities it was decided by the court that the Legal Tender
Acts of 1862 and 1863, insofar as they authorized the payment of debts ex-
isting before the passage of the acts in paper money, were unconstitutional
and void. This decision was made in conference,1 November 27, 1869, there
then being eight judges on the bench, and at that time the court was divided
five to three, to invalidate the Legal Tender Acts. At the request of the mi-
nority opinion, the announcement of this decision from the bench was with-
held to enable the preparation of minority opinions. On February 1, 1870,
Justice Grier, who voted in conference to invalidate the Legal Tender Acts,
resigned from the bench. On February 7th, 1870 the decision of the court,
heretofore arrived at in conference, was announced from the bench. This
resignation now left the door open for a reversal of this opinion through new
judicial appointments, and the procedural steps for this purpose were as fol-
lows: Congress, soon after Grant's election and inauguration, increased the
number of justices in the Supreme Court from 8 to 9 (the number having
been reduced during Johnson's presidency to deprive him of the right to make
an appointment to the bench) thus creating one new appointive office. By
reason of the resignation of Justice Grier, there was thus a second vacancy
existing. Justice Grier was one of the five judges voting for the unconstitu-
tionality of the Legal Tender Acts. It was now clear that if partisans to the
cause of fiat money were to be appointed to the court the judgment of Hep-
burn v. Griswold could be reversed.
On February 18, 1870, President Grant appointed Judge William Strong
of Pennsylvania to fill one of the vacancies, and on March 21, 1870, he ap-
pointed Joseph P. Bradley of New Jersey. Judge Strong had been on the
31 io U.S. 421 (1884).
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bench in Pennsylvania and he had rendered a judicial decision sustaining the
constitutionality of the legal tender, and Justice Bradley had been paid as an
attorney, to defend the constitutionality of the act at the bar of New Jersey.
No sooner had the Senate confirmed appointments of Strong and Bradley
than the Attorney General asked that the two cases pending before the Su-
preme Court (Knox v. Lee, and Parker v. Davis "2), involving the constitu-
tionality of the Legal Tender Acts that had been heretofore argued before the
court (November 1869) be reargued and submitted for decision. This re-
quest was granted by the court by a 5 to 4 decision of the judges. The five
judges voting for this motion comprised three judges who formerly dissented
in the case of Hepburn v. Griswold, plus Judges Strong and Bradley, and
therefore permitted the usual procedure of reargument and resubmission. Aft-
er copious reargument, the two cases were again resubmitted and on May 1,
1871, the court reversed the case of Hepburn v. Griswold. This of course was
due to the appointments of Strong and Bradley, because the complexion of the
original voting of the court was the same, the decision for reversal now stand-
ing 5 to 4, the court holding the Legal Tender Acts were a valid exercise of
the war power in respect to all contracts, whether made before or after the
passage of the Acts, and in so doing, it may be pointed out, that even more
devastating than the conclusion of the court in the question of the legality of
the Acts was the fact that Justice Bradley, in his concurring opinion, concluded
that the National Government is invested with "... all those inherent and im-
plied powers which, ... belong to every government as such,..." thusly at-
tacking limited government, the fundamental basis of the American Republic.
(Emphasis supplied.)
This settled the question of the legal tender until 1875 when Congress
ordered the redemption of the notes. However, in 1878, it stopped the re-
demption and enacted that there should be a reissue of the legal tender that
had come into the Treasury. This last act resulted in the question again being
brought before the court as to the legality of fiat money or legal tender notes
being issued during peace times. Formerly, the legal tender had been issued
during times of war. The case presenting this question was Juilliard v. Green-
man,3" and in this case, the court sustained the validity of the reissuance dur-
ing times of peace as well as war. The crux of the decision, as in the former
Legal Tender Cases, was the statement of the inherent or implied powers to
be found in the Federal Government, the court holding that the national gov-
ernment possessed inherent and sovereign powers by virtue of nationality.
32 See note 15 supra.
33 !10 U.S. 421 (1884).
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The actual effect of the Legal Tender Cases and that of Juillard v. Greenman
is to nullify the action of the Constitutional Convention as well as to negate
the constitutional limitation of Congress to emit bills of credit. Such a doc-
trine, once firmly established, reduces the Constitution to a meaningless parch-
ment.
But other changes rapidly occurred, more serious even, then the Legal
Tender Cases. In the case of Hawaii v. Mankichi,8' the petition of Mankichi
asked for a writ of hapeas corpus, alleging that he had been convicted in
Hawaii for manslaughter upon information of the Attorney General of the
Territory (not an indictment) and was convicted by a jury voting 9 for con-
viction and 3 for acquittal. Hawaii had been incorporated into the United
States at this time, and by the act of incorporation, the criminal law of Hawaii
was to continue only so far as it was not contrary to the Constitution of the
United States. Under our law 12 votes must be for guilty, and all criminal
proceedings (other than treason) must proceed from indictment by a grand
jury.
In this case the court laid down the most dangerous decree ever pro-
pounded by a court of justice. It held that the two guarantees; one of indict-
ment by grand jury " and one of trial by jury, " were not fundamental rights
but were procedural matters and therefore did not protect the inhabitants of
the Island even after annexation.
It is the writer's contention that if the right of indictment by grand jury,
and the right of trial and conviction by 12 jurors is not fundamental in its
nature, then it is hard to select any right set forth in the Constitution or Bill
of Rights that is fundamental. Our Bill of Rights embodied principles of Eng-
lish liberty which existed from 300 to 500 years before the adoption of our
Constitution. By this decision the Supreme Court has held that a person being
tried for a crime in the Territory of the United States annexed under these
provisions shall not have the protection of Article III, Section 2, clause 3, of
the United States Constitution or of the 5th and 6th Amendments thereto.
Where does the court secure the power to decide that certain portions of
our Constitution and Bill of Rights are material and certain portions of these
fundamental guarantees immaterial or merely procedural, and by what power
does it distinguish between these guaranteed rights. Is it not logical that if
the court can withhold certain of these guaranteed rights from the protection
"4 See note 16 supra.
35 U. S. CONST. amend. V.
'.16U S. CoNIT. art. III,§ 2, c. 3; U. S. CONST. amend. VI.
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of the individual one time, that at another time they can just as well hold all of
the rights to be immaterial?
In Pennsylvania v. Nelson," the defendant was convicted in the trial
courts of Pennsylvania for a violation of the Pennsylvania Sedition Act, which
forbids sedition against the United States Government and also the State of
Pennsylvania. The case was reversed in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In
the United States Supreme Court the court held (6-3) by reason of the enact-
ment by Congress of the Federal Smith Act in 1940, which proscribed advocacy
of the overthrow of the federal-state-or local governments by force or vio-
lence, that: "The conclusion is unescapable that Congress has intended to
occupy the field of sedition. Taken as a whole they evidenced a congressional
plan which makes it reasonable to determine that no room has been left for
the states to supplement it." In so doing the court by a margin of 2 votes
struck down the sedition laws in 42 states of the Union plus the Territories
of Hawaii and Alaska.
This majority holding is fallacious for two reasons: (1) The Federal
Smith Act does not in any wise bar the exercise of state power to punish in
similar acts under state law. In other words, the court has read into the Fed-
eral Act, phraseology and intent that Congress has specifically not placed
therein.
Secondly, and more germane and fundamental to the case, is the fact that
within the Union the states are sovereign in their own capacity and are the
parents and the creator of the Federal Government-that the power to con-
stitutionally create can be exercised by the states in the power to constitution-
ally alter the compact (Article V) or dissolve the union, and that the power
to preserve statehood is as primary as the power of the Federal Government
to maintain itself. It overlooks the 10th Amendment to the Constitution en-
tirely and the doctrine that all original sovereignty vests in the people or in
the states and not in the Federal Government, and that the Federal Govern-
ment is a government of delegated powers only. It seeks to make the states
the creature of the Federal Government rather than the Federal Government
the creature of the states.
The minority opinion of Justice Reed touches this vital question only sug-
gestively when he states, "in the responsibility of national and local govern-
ments to protect themselves against sedition there is no dominant interest."
In Cole v. Young " Congress had enacted on October 26, 1950, the Sum-
mary Suspension Act. The Act specifies eleven agencies of the government
"1 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
38 351 U.S. 536 (1955).
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and states that the head of any such agency "may, in his absolute discretion
and when deemed necessary in the interest of national security, suspend . . .
any employee ... of his agency." This may be followed by a complete termi-
nation of service. Under the authority of Section 3 of the Act, it was extended
by the President "to all other departments and agencies of the government."
In November of 1953 the petitioner (Cole), as a food and drug inspector
for the New York District of the Food and Drug Administration, Department
of Health, Education and Welfare, was suspended under the provisions of the
Act. He was given a written statement of charges that he had "a close asso-
ciation with individuals reliably reported to be Communists" and "a sympa-
thetic association" of an allegedly subversive organization. The secretary
of the department later concluded that Cole's employment was not "clearly
consistent with the interests of national security" and terminated the employ-
ment. The court held that the term "national security' is used in a limited
sense and relates only to those activities which are directly concerned with the
nation's safety as distinguished from the general welfare, and that the Act
was intended to authorize the suspension and dismissal only of persons in "sen-
sitive positions." And that not all positions of the Government are affected
with the "national security." They held the petitioner was wrongfully dis-
charged. (Author's emphasis.)
To this opinion there were three dissenting judges. The dissent stated
"The President having extended the coverage of the Act . . . it became the
duty of the Secretary (Department of Health) to dismiss any employee wher-
ever she deemed "it necessary and advisable in the interest of national se-
curity." She made such a finding and it is implicit in her order of dismissal.
Her "evaluation as to the effect which continuance of (petitioner's) employ-
ment might have upon the 'national security' has been made."
This is another illustration of the court reading into the law something
that is not there, to wit, the words "sensitive position." This is not only
judicial supremacy but judicial legislation as well.
What Madison said in 1835 was most important then, but it is more im-
portant now: "The authority of constitutions over governments, and of the
sovereignty of the people over the constitutions are truths which are at all
times necessary to be kept in mind and at no time more necessary than the
present."
Actually the doctrine of Judicial Supremacy has created a revolution in
constitutional construction, and as we are now going, has changed a limited
1957.1
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Federal Government operating under a written constitution into a govern-
ment operating under the judicial supremacy of the Supreme Court. Un-
fortunately, such decisions and this policy of the Court place the Court '.over
the constitution." Or, as said by Justice Stone, "While unconstitutional ex-
ercise of power by the executive and legislative branches of the government
is subject to judicial restraint, the only check on our exercise of power is our
own sense of self-restraint." 8
Justice Stone's schism in the Butler case stemmed from the fact that the
majority of the court refused to label agriculture as commerce. And his
conclusion is clear that while there is a complete emancipation of the court
from constitutional restraint, the executive and legislative branches of the
government are subject to constitutional limitations, but such circumscription
as may be chartered by the Supreme Court. It, of course, follows that if the
only limitation on the powers of the Supreme Court is its own sense of self-
restraint, it is a power without control and is no limitation whatsoever. As
a corollary to such postulation it also follows that such judicial omnipotence
can either negate the puissance of the executive or legislative branches of
the government or the gratuitousness of the court may subjoin to the powers
of the other branches of government, such cogency as it may desire to give.
This conclusion is well illustrated in the case of the United States v.
Curtis-Wright Corporation and subsequent decisions in which it has decreed
to the President,. inherent powers in the execution of executive agreements 4
and in the case of U.S. v. California," through the improvised doctrine of
"paramount rights," nowhere to be found in the United States Constitution,
39U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78 (1936).
40299 U.S. 304 (1936). Also see U.S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); Valentine v.
U.S., 299 U.S. 5 (1936); U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). The following executive agree-
ments also cogently illustrate this principal: The agreements of Cairo (Nov. 22, 1943); Teheran
(Nov. 28, 1943); Yalta (Feb. 4, 1945); all executed by President Roosevelt with Russia and
England; and Potsdam (July 17, 1945) executed by President Truman with England and Russia.
Also on point: Joseph L. Call, Government by Decree Through Executive Agreement, 6 BAYLOR
L. REv. 277 (1954).
41 332 U.S. 19 (1946). This decision of the Supreme Court quieted title of the United
States against the State of California in fee simple for possession of all rights and powers over
the lands and minerals and other things of value underlying the Pacific Ocean and lying seaward
of the ordinary low water mark for 3 nautical miles is based on the premise that ". . . the Federal
Government rather than the State has paramount rights in their power over that belt, and incident
to which is full dominion over the resources of the soil under that water, including oil." (Emphases
added.) The doctrine of "paramount rights" is not to be found in any of the delegations of
power given by the people or the States to the Federal government in the United States Constitution,
nor can it be implied therefrom. The only effect that can be given to this decision is to read
sovereignty and omnipotent power into the Federal Government. See also United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1940); Wickard v. Filburn (applying the Agricultural Act of 1938 to the Com-
merce Clause), 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939); Woods v. Cloyd
Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1947); Bowles v, Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1943); Yakus v. U.S.,
321 U.S. 414 (1944).
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there was again created and vested inherent powers in the Federal Govern-
ment.
And so in conclusion we see that through the doctrine of Judicial Su-
premacy a transposition has taken place, the result of such transmutation being
a sovereign centralized government of inherent powers restrained only by the
court's prenotion. By exercising the sole power to interpret its own authority
as well as the authority of the Congress, the President, and the people, the
Supreme Court has become absolute in its nature. As the power to interpret
includes the power to change, it of course follows that the court is not only
the guardian, but the master, of the Constitution. By such stewardship the
sovereignty, vested constitutionally in the people, has now been absorbed by
the court, and by such conversion it stands possessed as the ultimate sovereignty
in the United States rather than the people themselves being and possessing
the sovereign power.

